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Subnational Debt Finance and the Global Financial Crisis 
Otaviano Canuto and Lili Liu
Rising Importance of Subnational 
Debt Finance 
State and local debt and debt of quasi-public agencies have
been growing in importance. In Brazil, subnational debt ac-
counts for about 30 percent of total public sector net debt.
The debt of Indian states is about 27 percent of GDP (the
number would be higher if debt on the balance sheets of
companies such as power and water, which are wholly or
largely owned by the states, is included). The rising share of
subnational finance in consolidated public finance is not lim-
ited to federal countries. In France, SNGs now account for
more than 70 percent of public investment. Even in coun-
tries where varying degrees of fiscal decentralization have
been recent, SNGs account for an increasing share of public
investments—for example, approximately 50 percent in In-
donesia and Turkey.2
Three structural trends have contributed to the rising
share of subnational finance including SNG debt as a share
of general public debt. First, decentralization in many coun-
tries has given SNGs certain spending responsibilities, rev-
enue-raising power, and the capacity to incur debt. With
sovereign access to financial markets, SNGs are pushing for
access to these markets as well, particularly given the rising
regional and subnational political power that is a driving
force in decentralization.
Second, the unprecedented scale of urbanization in de-
veloping countries requires large-scale urban infrastructure
financing to help absorb massive influxes of rural popula-
tions. Borrowing enables SNGs to capture the benefits of
major capital investments immediately, rather than waiting
until sufficient savings from current income can be accumu-
lated to finance them. Infrastructure investments benefit fu-
ture generations who therefore should also bear the cost.
Subnational borrowing finances infrastructure more equi-
tably across multigenerational users of infrastructure services
because the maturity of debt can match the economic life
of the assets that the debt is financing. Infrastructure services
thus can be paid for by the beneficiaries of the services. 
Third, the subnational debt market in developing coun-
tries has been going through a notable transformation. Pri-
vate  capital  has  emerged  to  play  an  important  role  in
subnational finance in countries such as Poland, Romania,
and the Russian Federation. Subnational bonds increasingly
compete with traditional bank loans. Notwithstanding the
temporary disruption of the subnational credit markets dur -
This note focuses on the impact of the global financial crisis on subnational debt financing.1 We approach the
following questions: Why is subnational debt financing important? What are the impacts of the crisis on the fiscal
balance and financing cost of subnational governments (SNGs)? What explains the variations across countries in
the ability of SNGs to proactively address the threat of fiscal deterioration? And, equally important, what are the
long-term structural challenges facing SNGs in sustainable financing of infrastructure and social services? ing the crisis, the trend of more diversified subnational credit
markets is expected to continue. SNGs or their entities in
various countries have already issued bond instruments (for
example, in China, Colombia, India, Mexico, Poland, Russia,
and South Africa). More countries are considering policy
frameworks for facilitating subnational debt market devel-
opment (for example, Indonesia), whereas other countries
are allowing selected subnational entities to pilot-test trans-
action and capacity-building activities to the same effect (for
example, Peru). 
Impact of the Financial Crisis on Fiscal
Balance 
The global financial crisis has had a profound impact on sub-
national finance across countries. Slower or negative national
and regional economic growth has generally reduced the
SNGs’ own revenues; the exact impact is influenced by the
revenue structure of the SNG. Subnational government en-
tities with strong dependence on revenues from highly cycli-
cal economic activities such as housing and commodity
exports will have experienced more negative impact than
will the SNGs that have more stable revenue sources such
as property taxes based on delayed assessment. SNGs relying
heavily on sales, value-added, and income taxes also have ex-
perienced reduced revenue buoyancy. Fiscal transfers that
are based on formulas with a time lag will suffer less imme-
diate impact, although the pressures are only being delayed. 
The deterioration in primary balance is driven by declin-
ing revenues combined with expenditure rigidity or contin-
uing expenditures. In general, countries’ fiscal needs are
rising but fiscal space is narrowing, resulting in deteriorating
fiscal positions across regions and tiers of the government. 
Figure 1 highlights trends of fiscal balance as a share of
GDP from 2005 to 2009 in the BRIC countries and in four
advanced economies. The rising fiscal deficit—particularly
from 2008 to 2009—happened across all these countries ex-
cept Brazil, where the improvement in 2009 was largely to
the result of a fall in interest payments as a share of GDP
(from 1.85 percent in 2008 to 0.47 percent the following
year). This decline is linked to deflation in the General Price
Index (that is, the IGP), which indexes state debts with the
federal government.
All major rating agencies viewed the impact of the eco-
nomic downturn on the credit qualities of SNGs as signifi-
cant  because  of  declines  in  the  tax  base,  expenditure
pressures or rigidities, and increasing and more expensive
debt (Fitch Ratings 2009; Moody’s Investor Service 2010;
S&P 2010). From October 2008 to January 2010, Moody’s
rating actions affected 72 SNGs, or 24 percent of the rated
universe, outside the United States. Ninety-six percent of
the actions were in a downward direction. For example, 31
percent of the actions were downward for Western Europe
and Commonwealth of Independent States/Central and
Eastern Europe countries, and 13 percent were downward
in Asia Pacific. There was a general shift toward negative out-
looks for 2009 in the Fitch ratings of European SNGs, and
the downward pressure is expected to continue into 2010.
Similarly, S&P’s negative rating actions for European SNGs
largely exceeded positive ones in 2009, and the trend is
likely to continue in 2010. 
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Sources: Government Web sites; World Bank country teams; Center for
Fiscal Policy (Russia).
Note: Fiscal data are aggregated over all SNGs (for example, states, munic-
ipalities) in each country, except India (where data are for states). Rev-
enues may include one-off receipts, such as privatization proceeds. 
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Figure 1. Fiscal Balance as a Share of GDP, 2005–09
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Sources: Government Web sites; Fitch Ratings (2010).
Note: Fiscal data are aggregated over all SNGs (for example, states,
municipalities) in each country. Revenues may include one-off receipts,




b. For SNGs in selected countries
France
SpainImpact of the Financial Crisis on the Cost 
of Capital
Liquidity squeeze and lower risk appetite generally led to
higher financial costs at the height of the crisis, as measured
by the cost of subsovereign bond issuances3; however, the cost
of financing has declined since mid-2009. As illustrated in fig-
ure 2a, yield spread for subnational bond issuance steadily in-
creased from 2008Q1 to 2009Q2, whereas maturity exhibited
a generally declining trend from 2007Q3 to 2009Q1.4Further
decomposing yield spread, the rising spread was driven mainly
by the rising spread of bonds with maturity of less than seven
years; and the impact on maturity of seven years or longer has
not been as significant (figure 2b). However, the share of sub-
national bonds with maturity of seven years or more declined
from 60 percent in 2007 to 41 percent in 2009. 
Bank loans have long dominated SNG debt financing in
many countries (unlike the United States, where SNG debt
financing has relied on the capital market). However, as
shown by figure 3, SNG bond issuance outside the United
States has increased since the onset of the global crisis. Various
countries have been exploring capital markets for mobilizing
financing during the crisis period. The United States remains
the largest SNG bond market, with annual issuance of about
$400 billion. The following top five countries are Germany,
Japan, Canada, China, and Spain; together, they account for
about 85 percent of about $308 billion global SNG bond is-
suance (excluding the United States) in 2009 (figure 4). 
There are significant variations in the access to and cost
of SNG debt financing across and within countries. With a
deep and competitive capital market in the United States,
the cost of borrowing is directly related to the creditworthi-
ness of SNGs. As shown by figure 5, the cost of borrowing
for 10-year U.S. municipal general obligation bonds is the
lowest for AAA-rated SNG borrowers; each notch down in
ratings progressively increases the cost of borrowing, with
BBB-rated SNGs bearing higher costs than better-rated ones.
With imperfect financial markets in developing countries
and capital controls in some countries, the cost structure
may not be related to creditworthiness, because of factors
such as subsidized policy lending, monopoly supply by pub-
lic banks, and relaxed credit conditions of stimulus packages. 
Countercyclical Macroeconomic Policies 
and SNGs
To counter the global financial crisis, countries have launched
countercyclical  macroeconomic  policies.  The  ability  of
SNGs to cushion the impact of the crisis depends on a num-


































Figure 2. Quarterly Yield Spread and Maturity for Subnational Bonds
Issuance, 2007–10 (Excluding the United States)
Source: DCM Analytics.




























































Note: Maturity of three to seven years means those issuances with maturity
greater than or equal to three years but less than seven years. Thirty per-
cent of bond issuances have yield spread recorded.
< 3 years 3–7 years ≥ 7 years













































Figure 3. Global Subnational Bond Issuance, 2000–10Q1 (Excluding
the United States)
yearber of factors, with sovereign macroeconomic fundamentals
being a dominant factor. 
Major international rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s, and
S&P) cap subsovereign credit ratings within the sovereign
credit ratings; and rarely do subsovereign ratings exceed that
of the sovereign (figure 6). A country’s macroeconomic man-
agement and countrywide risks affect not only the broader
economic, fiscal, and financial conditions under which an
SNG operates; they also place restrictions on an SNG’s abil-
ity to raise funds. The national government typically has a
wide range of constitutional powers giving it first claim over
the country’s foreign reserves and other resources. Thus, in a
financial crisis, the national government would likely be able
to fulfill its external or domestic debt obligations ahead of





























































Figure 4. Top Five Countries in Issuing Subnational Bonds, 2000–09
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Figure 6. Correlation between Sovereign and Subsovereign Ratings of European Countries
Source: Standard & Poor’s, http://www.standardandpoors.com.
Note: The sample size is 141 subsovereign governments from 22 European countries. One dot could represent multiple subsovereigns because many of
them share the same sovereign and subsovereign ratings. The only subsovereigns whose ratings exceed its sovereign rating are the Autonomous Commu-
nity of Basque Country and Navarre of Spain (the dot below the 45ﾰ line). Ratings used are as of February 23, 2010.









































































CCC+the  SNG.  The  rating  “ceiling”  relationship  applies  less
strongly to domestic currency debt instruments. Even in cases
where the SNG possesses foreign currency reserves that are
out of reach of the national government, the latter neverthe-
less could impose nationwide capital or exchange controls to
restrict capital outflows and thereby disallow the SNG to
repay its foreign debts. In short, the sovereign is unlikely to
default before any SNG does so. 
Macroeconomic  fundamentals  affect  subsovereign  fi-
nance mainly through key variables that impact subnational
fiscal sustainability. They affect real interest rates (adjusting
for inflation and currency movement) and thus the base cost
of borrowing; at the same time, a subnational’s own fiscal
position and economic growth affect the spread over the
base cost structure. Even when subnationals cannot borrow
directly from foreign markets, macroeconomic shocks and
currency volatility affect the cost of borrowing by SNGs
through real interest rate channels. A central government
with a large fiscal space can afford increased fiscal transfers
to SNGs to reduce borrowing needs or to continue capital
spending during recession.
The ability of SNGs to cushion the impact of crisis is
framed by the larger national-level response, and fiscally strong
SNGs such as coastal regions in China also have responded
forcefully. Box 1 summarizes selected country highlights. 
Regulatory Frameworks for Subnational Debt
Financing
Following the 1990s when subnational fiscal stress or debt
crises contributed to macroeconomic deterioration in major
developing countries (such as Argentina, Brazil, India, and
Russia), SNG finance has been substantially strengthened
across various developing countries. SNGs there had stronger
fiscal and liquidity positions when the current global crisis
broke out, thanks to extensive fiscal consolidation taking
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Box 1. Fiscal Stimulus Relating to SNGs: Selected Country Highlights
Brazil: The three-year Programs of Fiscal Adjustments between
the National Treasury and the 27 states adjusted the primary
balances and indebtedness targets and broadened the fiscal
space for new borrowing. Through its development bank, the fed-
eral government created a credit line for SNGs that had suffered
loss of federal transfers. Given that some states were not in com-
pliance with the requirements of fiscal responsibility legislation,
this operation is considered to be exceptional and allows all
states to contract the credit operation. 
China: The country launched a large stimulus package centered
on infrastructure spending, combined with increases in transfers,
consumer subsidies, and tax cuts. A significant part of the pack-
age supports SNG infrastructure and social spending, with SNG
cofinancing partly supported by provincial bonds totaling Y 200
billion ($30 billion). The central government issued the bonds
on behalf of SNGs as a transitional step (debt will be booked on
provincial accounts), taking advantage of the sovereign bond ex-
perience and cost advantage. Provinces and municipalities with
fiscal space also have introduced their own fiscal packages. 
France: The central government reduced the delay in refunding
value-added tax to SNGs, enabling them to maintain capital ex-
penditures in 2009 above the 2004–07 average. The expected
value-added tax refund payments in 2009 totaled more than ᾬ4
billion, equivalent to 8 percent of SNG capital expenditures in
2009. Overall net borrowing by French SNGs increased by ᾬ5.1
billion in 2009, while total outstanding debt as a share of GDP
increased by 4 percent over 2008; but debt accounts for only
4.2 years of overall SNG current balance. 
India: The central government allowed the states to raise addi-
tional market borrowings, thus increasing the limit of gross fiscal
deficit to 3.5 percent of gross state domestic product in fiscal
2008/09, and to 4.0 percent in fiscal 2009/10. The consoli-
dated expenditure of states rose by 25.0 percent during fiscal
2008/09 (revised estimate), compared with 14.8 percent during
fiscal 2007/08 (accounts). A few states have announced their
own dedicated fiscal stimulus packages, and some states have
announced certain tax exemptions/reductions. 
Russian Federation: The federal government increased the amount
of financial aid to SNGs by 45 percent from the amount initially
budgeted for 2009, largely offsetting the revenue fall for SNGs.
Therefore, budget revenues of most SNGs are likely to be close
to 2008 levels. Less-developed regions, which are more depend-
ent on transfers, appear to be less affected by the crisis. From
the budget, the federal government also provided SNGs with low-
cost loans having three-year maturity. 
United States: The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009 provided nearly $135 billion in emergency funding, help-
ing states avoid draconian cuts in services. With $87 billion in
additional Medicaid funding via increased federal medical assis-
tance percentage rates and $48 billion as part of the State Fiscal
Stabilization Fund, states were able to maintain critical funding
for social services. Through fiscal 2010, states will have spent
$150 billion in recovery act funds. States have expenditure flex-
ibility, revenue power, and balanced-budget requirements. 
Sources: Fitch Ratings (2009); government Web sites; NGA/NASBO
(2009); World Bank country teams.place prior to the crisis in countries such as Brazil, India,
Mexico, and Russia. In Brazil, SNGs’ net debt as a percent of
GDP decreased from 18 percent in 2003 to 14 percent in
2007. In India, the fiscal deficit of states declined from 4.0
percent of GDP on average in 2000–05 to 1.5 percent in
2007–08; and states achieved positive operating balances. In
countries such as Peru and Poland, the governments have em-
phasized the importance of fiscal sustainability at the start
of decentralization. 
A core part of the regulatory frameworks is placing limits
on key fiscal variables, such as fiscal deficit, primary deficit,
debt service ratios, and guarantees. Most frameworks also re-
quire balancing the operating budget. The fiscal and debt
limitations imposed on SNGs, either by their national gov-
ernments or by the SNGs themselves, are not limited to de-
veloping countries (box 2). Most states in the United States
have constitutional provisions on debt limitations. Similarly,
France has a strong framework regulating SNG fiscal ac-
counts. Many states/provinces in Australia and Canada have
their own fiscal responsibility legislation.
Because the financial market and rating agencies evaluate
combined public debt (national government and SNGs),
debt financing limits for SNGs can be subordinate to the
debt space of national governments. If the national govern-
ment runs a high fiscal deficit and accumulates a large debt
stock, this could further limit th  e ability of a subnational
government to raise funds—even if it operates well below
its own debt limit. 
Long-Term Structural Issues
Looking beyond the crisis and stabilization, there are long-
term structural issues with respect to SNG debt finance in
developing countries. Rapid urbanization, with unprece-
dented rural-to-urban migration, will continue to demand
massive urban infrastructure investments—investments that
largely have been decentralized to SNGs in many countries.
Developing countries invest an annual average of 3–4 per-
cent of GDP on infrastructure, well short of what is consid-
ered  to  be  required  (7–8  percent).  The  scale  and  the
sustainability of infrastructure financing will critically de-
pend on SNG fiscal sustainability.
The sovereign’s macroeconomic fundamentals will con-
tinue to be vital to the fiscal sustainability of SNGs. With
the gradual withdrawal of fiscal stimulus packages and the
ending of monetary easing, pressures on SNGs’ fiscal space
could increase through various channels, such as reduced fis-
cal transfers and higher borrowing costs. It is all the more
important that countries continue to pursue structural re-
forms to sustain economic growth and develop efficient fi-
nancial markets. 
Consolidating public finance through higher expenditure
efficiency and structural reforms in the taxation systems for
both national and subnational governments will become im-
portant to counter the negative impact of stimulus with-
drawals. Intergovernmental fiscal systems also will need to
grant subnationals a certain degree of fiscal autonomy, in-
cluding making the budget process less rigid and allowing
subnationals taxation power at the margin; this helps make
SNGs more resilient and flexible in responding to crises. 
Whereas significant progress has been made in establish-
ing ex ante fiscal rules for subnationals in various countries
to reduce default risks, newly decentralizing countries will
need to develop regulatory frameworks for subnational debt
instruments before opening up SNG access to financial mar-
kets. More also needs to be done in developing a robust ex
post insolvency system for debt restructuring in the case of
subnational defaults. A sound insolvency system reduces
moral hazard of free-riding on common resources by indi-
vidual SNGs and sends signals to financial markets about
pricing risks and returns. 
Many SNGs have created special-purpose vehicles to un-
dertake infrastructure investments, often in partnership with
private financiers and operators. Such vehicles can play an im-
portant role in developing infrastructure networks that cut
across the boundaries of subnational administrations. But the
special-purpose vehicle operations must be within a transpar-
ent governance and financial structure to ensure that they do
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Box 2. Regulating Subnational Debt: Country Examples
• Brazil: Fiscal Responsibility Law (2000)
• Colombia: Law 358 (1997); Law 617 (2000); Fiscal
Transparency and Responsibility Law (2003)
• France: various borrowing regulations and balanced
budget rules
• India: states’ Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Man-
agement Acts, following the 12th Finance Commission
• Mexico: new subnational borrowing framework in
2000
• Peru: Fiscal Responsibility and Transparency Law
(amended 2003); General Debt Law (2005)
• Poland: Public Finance Law (1998, 2005)
• South Africa: Municipal Finance Management Act
(2003)
• Turkey: various regulations since the early 2000s
• United States: state regulations (for example, limits
on deficit financing)
Sources: Liu and Waibel (2009); research by the authors.not become a means of circumventing borrowing limits, and
that they do not become contingent liabilities of their creators. 
Accessing financial markets can be a challenge for smaller
SNGs or those in less-developed regions. For the former, de-
veloping models of pooled finance can reduce financing cost,
as shown by experiences in such countries as Italy and the
United States. For the latter, fiscal transfers will continue to
play an important role in basic provision of services. 
Another significant fiscal risk comes from land financing
of infrastructure, with land and other hard assets serving as
collateral for debt instruments such as bank loans. The up-
swing in the value of hard assets in economic boom times
can lead to excessive borrowing; and the volatility of land
and real estate markets creates risks for nonperforming loans,
which can become a liability of the national government and
create macroeconomic risks. 
The global financial crisis reinforces the importance of
managing refinancing and liquidity risks. SNGs, like their na-
tional governments, need to strengthen capacity to manage
structural risks of debt profiles with respect to maturity mix,
real interest rates, currency mix (if they are allowed to bor-
row in foreign markets), and liquidity. Managing such risks
becomes more important given the uncertainty of sovereign
risks and sustained global recovery. Developing countries also
would benefit by learning from the financial disasters that
have resulted from using exotic speculative structured finan-
cial products. In recent years, SNGs in some developed coun-
tries have used such products with disastrous consequences. 
The global financial crisis has also brought home the im-
portance of developing domestic financial markets, including
subnational credit markets. A competitive and diversified
subnational credit market can help ensure the lowest cost
and the sustainable availability of credit. This means opening
access on equal terms to bank lending and bond issuance and
prohibiting monopolies of “municipal or development banks.”
Securities laws and market infrastructure are part of devel-
oping subnational credit markets.
Notes
1. The term subnational refers to all tiers of government
and public entities below the federal or central government.
Subnational entities include states or provinces, counties,
cities, towns, public utility companies, school districts, and
other special-purpose government entities that have the ca-
pacity to incur debt.
2. Data are from government Web sites and World Bank
country teams.
3. It is difficult to obtain comprehensive data on the cost
and structure of bank loans to SNGs. 
4. DCM Analytics is the data source for all figures in this
section. Data coverage for bond issuances with maturity less
than three years is incomplete. Data are bonds issued by
SNGs, and the data for China and India also include bond
issuances by entities largely or wholly owned by an SNG
(for example, a utility company). References to U.S. subna-
tional bond issuance in this section include bond issuance
by special-purpose vehicles created by an SNG.
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